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We study the informativeness of trades via discount and full-service retail brokers. We 
find that trades via full-service retail brokers are statistically and economically more informative 
than are trades via discount retail brokers. This finding holds in every year over the twelve-year 
sample period and in various subsamples. We also find that past returns, volatility, and news 
announcements positively relate to the net volume of discount retail brokers but these variables 
are unrelated to the net volume of full-service retail brokers. Our results suggest that broker type 
selection bias is an important consideration in studying individual investors’ trades. 
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This paper examines the informativeness of individual investors’ trades across different 
broker types. Although a large literature studies individual investors’ trades, the informational 
role of these trades in asset prices is still unclear. Odean (1998) and Barber and Odean (2000, 
2002) use client level data from a US discount retail broker to study individual investors’ 
portfolio decisions, finding that individual investors exhibit various biases and generate losses 
when they trade. A number of studies that extend this line of inquiry conclude that individual 
investors’ trades are uninformative about future stock returns.1 On the other hand, Kaniel, Saar 
and Titman (2008) and Kaniel et al. (2012) use the NYSE consolidated audit trail data, which tag 
trades originated by individual investors, and find that the intensity of individual investors’ 
buying and selling can predict future stock returns. Similarly, Kelly and Tetlock (2012) find the 
buy-sell imbalance of retail orders routed through two market centers positively predicts the 
cross-section of stock returns.  
One potential reason for the mixed results is that individual investors are a highly 
heterogeneous group: some subsets are likely to be highly skilled while others may be naive. We 
conjecture that using data from one type of broker pre-filters data and reduces investor 
heterogeneity. Retail brokers specialize by offering distinct services and this can lead to 
systematic differences in clientele and trade informativeness. Individual investors of certain 
characteristics are more likely to focus on minimizing brokerage costs and trade via discount 
retail brokers. Investors that fit this category include liquidity traders who buy or sell shares for 
                                                 
1 See Feng and Seasholes (2004), Kumar and Lee (2006), Kumar (2009), and Seasholes and Zhu (2010) for studies 
that used the same dataset as Odean (1998). Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009), and Dorn, Huberman and Sengmueller 




saving and consumption purpose, speculators and day traders who trade and pay brokerage fees 
frequently, self-directed individual investors who make investment decisions independent of 
their stock brokers, and investors with trading ideas of lower marginal profit. The fact that 
discount retail brokers’ popularity grew along with the internet also leads one to suspect that they 
disproportionately attract new and inexperienced investors. On the other hand, individual 
investors that have longer investment horizons and incur transaction costs infrequently, who are 
wealthy, or have a high opportunity cost of time, may be less concerned with brokerage cost.  
These investors, as well as individual investors that are cautious, may want to use a full-service 
broker because they think that a full-service broker may be able to provide useful information, 
advice, or services2 to improve the efficiency and outcomes of their investments. Overall, the 
informativeness of individual investors’ trades may differ across broker types due to the clientele 
selection effect and valuable brokers’ advice. 
Whether the informativeness of individual investors’ trades differs significantly across 
broker types is ultimately an empirical question. To address this question, we use transaction 
data from the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), which identifies the broker on both sides of 
every trade, so we know the trade direction of each broker precisely. We manually collect 
information on the business description of individual brokers from articles, books, commercials, 
and archived and current websites to identify discount retail and full-service retail brokers, 
among other broker types, without relying on the transaction or order data. We interpret trades 
via retail brokers as individual investors’ trades as in Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu (2003). The 
informativeness of retail order flow has a strong broker specific component (Kelly and Tetlock 
                                                 
2 Individual investors need not be looking for inside or private information. The broker can act as a sounding board 
to validate (or falsify) investment ideas and to provide information such as analyst reports, aggregate order flow of 
funds, or other investors for the investor to gauge sentiment.  
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(2012) and Linnainmaa and Saar (2012)), hence drawing inferences from trades from a small 
number of brokers about the population of individual investors’ trades is limited by broker 
selection bias. We use trades from the population of pure discount retail and full-service retail 
brokers to reduce such broker selection bias while controlling for the broker type selection effect 
in this study. Our dataset offers two other desirable features. First, the ASX has been a 
consolidated limit order book market over the full sample period, and there is no payment for 
order flow and internalization practice as in the US. Internalization leads to the netting of 
offsetting trades before reporting. Netted trades are likely to be uninformed, and the inability to 
observe them causes an upward bias in the informativeness of observed trades. All trades on the 
ASX are reported before netting, so we avoid the trade selection bias in using US data. Second, 
the dataset covers thirteen calendar years from 1995 to 2007; thus, the sample period is 
significantly longer than those used in other studies. The long sample period allows us to check 
whether the results are robust across sub-periods.  
Our central finding is that trades via full-service retail brokers are significantly more 
informative than are trades via discount retail brokers in every year over the sample period. More 
specifically, using the transactions-based calendar-time (TBCT) portfolio methodology of 
Seasholes and Zhu (2010), we find that the buys minus sells portfolio of trades via discount retail 
brokers consistently generates significantly negative alphas at horizons ranging from end-of-the-
day to 6 months, while the trades via full-service retail brokers generate positive returns at 
horizons from 1 to 20 days. The largest trade informativeness difference is at the end-of-the-day 
horizon where the daily TBCT portfolio alpha difference across the two retail broker types is 
18.41 basis points per day or 58.383 percent annualized. The difference shrinks to 3.02 basis 
                                                 
3 Assuming 250 trading days in a year, 1.001841250 – 1 = 0.5838. 
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points per day or 7.84 percent annualized if individual investors have a 20 day (1 month) 
horizon.  
We perform a number of additional analyses to gain a better understanding of the trade 
informativeness across retail broker types. First, we separately examine both market order trades 
and limit order trades and find very similar effects. This finding suggests that the poor 
performance of discount brokers cannot be entirely attributed to the adverse selection effects 
associated with limit order trades. We also separately examine informativeness by stock size. We 
find that the trade informativeness difference across retail broker types is typically largest, and 
persists over longer horizons, in smaller stocks, but is also present in larger stocks.  We study the 
determinants of individual investor net volume and discover that only the net volume of trades 
via discount retail brokers is related to past returns, volatility, and news announcements. 
Our evidence highlights that broker type is an important filter that reduces heterogeneity 
amongst individual investors. This result suggests that broker type selection is an important 
consideration in designing and interpreting the evidence of an individual investor study. Viewed 
from this perspective, the diverse findings in the literature are not surprising. Earlier studies that 
focus on trades from discount retail brokers result in sampling trades from the less informative 
broker type. In general, we should be cautious about generalizing the results of a study if we do 
not know the composition of individual investors’ trades across broker types in the data relative 
to the population.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the ASX market and 
the data, Section III explains the broker type classification procedure, Section IV details the trade 
informativeness measurement methodology, and Section V presents the results. We discuss 




The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) is the only significant stock exchange in 
Australia during the sample period and there are no designated market makers. Since 1990, 
trading of all ASX listed stocks takes place via a consolidated electronic limit order book system. 
The ASX starts trading from 10:00 a.m. using an auction algorithm, then switches to operate as a 
continuous open limit order book until 4:00 p.m. The trading system establishes the close price 
in a stock with an auction shortly after 4:00 p.m. 
We obtain transaction data on the ASX from the Securities Industry Research Centre of 
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The dataset covers all stock trades from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 
2007. Each trade record includes the timestamp, ticker, price, the bid and ask price just prior to 
the transaction, trade flag, and buying and selling broker identifiers. The trade flag indicates 
whether the trade is a buyer- or seller-initiated trade, an auction trade, or an off-market trade. In 
order to compute daily returns, we collect dividends, capitalization adjustments, and month-end 
share market capitalization data from the Australian School of Business’ Centre for Research in 
Finance Share Price and Price Relative database (CRIF SPPR). We also obtain financial year-end 
book-value data from Aspect Financial in order to compute risk-adjusted returns. 
Table 1 reports the turnover velocity,4 total turnover and the number of trades per year, as 
well as the average trade value. Total turnover during the thirteen-year period is AUD7.83 
trillion. Annual total turnover has grown 15 times from AUD120.5 billion in 1995 to 
AUD1,804.9 billion in 2007. The total number of trades has increased at an even faster pace, and 
                                                 
4 The turnover velocity follows the definition on the World Federation of Exchanges website (http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/statistics-definitions) and is calculated as the average monthly turnover of domestic shares, 
divided by their average month-end’s total market capitalization. The monthly average figure is then annualized by 
multiplying by 12.  
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results in the average trade value falling from AUD41,000 to AUD26,000. 5  The turnover 
velocity of the market almost tripled in this period from 33.9 percent to 108.8 percent. The 
increased turnover velocity is similar to the NYSE experience during the same period where 
turnover velocity increased from 55.5 percent to 167.1 percent.6  
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
III. Broker	Classification	
Starting with broker names, we collect information about each broker's business in order 
to classify the broker into one of five distinct categories: discount retail, full-service retail, 
institutional, mixed (full-service retail and institutional), and other. We focus on the discount 
retail and full-service retail brokers in this study because they represent pure retail broker types 
and the comparison yields clear interpretation. The steps we take to collect information on each 
broker are as follows: 
1. Check existing broker's website or archived broker's website from the Internet Archive 
(http://www.archive.org/).  
2. If no website exists or the broker type cannot be determined from its website, search 
Factiva for newspaper articles, trade journals, company announcements, or web articles on the 
broker.  
3. If no Factiva articles exist to classify the broker, Google search the broker for any 
credible articles that may classify the broker. From doing this, we classified one broker from a 
book about the broker’s history. 
                                                 
5 The trend in trade size and trade activity likely reflects the growth of practices such as algorithmic trading (see e.g. 
Humphery-Jenner (2011)). Our results are robust to time effects and hold across all twelve years of our sample, so 
any such changes in trading activity are unlikely to drive our results.  
6 Sourced from the World Federation of Exchanges website (www.world-exchanges.org). 
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4. If the broker still exists today but has no identifying information from a website, 
Factiva, or Google, we telephone the broker and ask for their clientele (institutional, mixed, or 
retail) and the type of services that they provide (advisory or non-advisory). We did this for two 
brokers.  
5. If a broker's classification cannot be determined from the above steps, the broker is 
classified as Other.  
Appendix A illustrates how we use the hand-collected data to classify brokers. For 
example, we classify a broker as a discount retail broker based on the broker’s website if 
brokerage commission features prominently on its site and there is no mention of full-service or 
institutional sales. Our classification procedure therefore provides a direct and transparent 
method to classify brokers. It is also unlikely to misclassify brokers for two reasons. First, it is 
reasonable to believe that a broker’s website or newspaper articles would focus on the broker’s 
main strategy and clientele. For example, it is unlikely that a discount retail broker would purport 
to be an institutional broker or a full-service retail broker on its website or in newspaper articles. 
Second, we have a "mixed" category which removes ambiguity in forcing brokers to be one of 
the pure broker types and we also have an "other" category for broker names and identifiers for 
which we have not been able to obtain any information. 
Our broker classification approach is most similar to Jackson (2003), who groups brokers 
into discount retail, full-service retail, and institutional by examining the broker’s website. 
Without client level data of each trade, our methodology to classify brokers appears to be 
reasonable in comparison to the literature. 7   
                                                 
7 Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu (2003) converse with Nasdaq and industry participants to classify brokers into 
whether they primarily handle institutional or individual (retail) clients. They provide support for their classification 
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Table 2 presents the annual statistics by broker type. Panel A shows that there are 203 
unique broker identifiers during our sample period, and the first discount broker appeared in 
1995. Not all brokers operate at the same time and there are approximately 90 brokers in any 
given year. Panel B shows that full-service brokers and discount retail brokers account for 9.44 
percent of the aggregated trade value over the full sample period. While their aggregate market 
share is stable over time, discount retail brokers have increased their market share in turnover. 
This shift in market share is due to the rapid increase of the dollar turnover of discount retail 
brokers rather than a decline in dollar turnover of full-service retail brokers. Full-service retail 
brokers’ turnover actually increased from AUD14.28 billion in 1995 to AUD32.31 billion in 
2007.8 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
As an independent check of our identification of retail versus institutional brokers, Table 
3 presents the dollar turnover distribution of full-service and discount retail brokers by stock 
size. We expect individual investors to account for a larger fraction of turnover in small stocks 
because the most common benchmarks for Australian equity funds during the sample period are 
the S&P/ASX 300 and S&P/ASX 200 indices; hence, institutional investors are much more 
active in trading the top 200-300 stocks. Therefore, we form three stock groups every month 
during 1995 to 2007 based on the market capitalization ranking of a stock at the end of the 
previous month: the largest 50 stocks, the 51st to 300th stocks, and stocks smaller than the 300th. 
We then compute the turnover share of each broker type over the entire sample period. The 
brokers that we classify as retail brokers account for an increasing fraction of turnover as stock 
                                                                                                                                                             
system by showing that the trade-size characteristics of each broker conform to the separation of institutional and 
retail order flow. 
8 Multiply the total turnover in Table 1 in a given year by the market share in Table 2 Panel B yields these values.  
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size falls. Panel A shows that the two retail broker types account for 6.7 percent of the turnover 
in the top 50 stocks and 44.6 percent in the turnover of stocks outside the top 300 stocks. 
Furthermore, Panel B shows that 49.9 percent of the dollar turnover of full-service and discount 
retail brokers are in the top 50 stocks and 17.7 percent of their dollar turnover are in stocks 
outside the top 300. The corresponding turnover shares for institutional brokers are 75.2 percent 
and 1 percent, respectively. The statistics for the mixed brokers are indeed somewhere between 
those of retail and institutional brokers. Overall, the turnover-share statistics across stock size-
groups supports our broker classification between retail and institutional brokers.  
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
Given the five-step approach that we use and the allowance of mixed and other broker 
categories, we expect any residual retail broker classification errors to be random. Our goal is to 
quantify the trade informativeness difference across the two types of retail brokers, and random 
errors would reduce the likelihood of finding positive difference because they can only make the 
two subsets of trades less distinct. 
IV. Transactions‐Based	Calendar‐Time	Portfolios		
We adapt the transactions-based calendar-time (henceforth, TBCT) portfolio 
methodology of Seasholes and Zhu (2010) to multiple horizons in this study. The TBCT 
methodology corrects several issues commonly encountered in measuring individual investors’ 
trade informativeness. It allows researchers to fully utilize all the data, and it aggregates 
thousands of time series across individuals and stocks into a single time series. It accounts for 
cross-sectional correlation across stock returns that would otherwise distort measures of 
statistical significance. In addition, this approach also permits the value weighting of all buys and 
sells over the full time series; hence, it eliminates the effect of a large number of small stocks or 
low volume days that are of little economic significance to the results.  
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The TBCT portfolio methodology requires us to add the number of shares in each buy 
trade to a “buys” portfolio daily and to remove the same number of shares from the portfolio 
holdings after a fixed period, e.g., 20 days. The portfolio’s value and composition change over 
time as we add shares and remove holdings. We construct the “sells” portfolio analogously and 
compute daily value-weighted returns for these portfolios by marking the holdings and new 
trades to daily close prices. The informativeness of a collection of trades, e.g. trades via discount 
brokers, over a calendar-time horizon is measured by the mean daily difference between returns 
on the buys portfolio and returns on the sells portfolio. In order to assess the difference in the 
informativeness of trades across broker types, we use the difference-in-difference design by 
subtracting the buys-minus-sells TBCT portfolio returns of trades via discount retail brokers 
from the buys-minus-sells returns of trades via full-service retail brokers. Finally, we risk adjust 
returns by using the Carhart (1997) four factor model to compute alphas. 
The literature measures trade informativeness at horizons ranging from 5 minutes to 1 
year (see e.g. Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) and Seasholes and Zhu (2010)).9 The wide horizon 
range in prior studies suggests an awareness of both short- and long-lived information. With the 
TBCT portfolio methodology, short horizon portfolios will not be able to capture long-lived 
information because the information is incorporated into the stock price slowly over many days 
or months. Similarly, long horizon TBCT portfolios will add noise to the measured 
informativeness if the information is in fact short-lived, such as those related to institutional 
trading-induced short-term price pressure or price adjustment following information 
                                                 
9 Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) use permanent price impact over a five-minute horizon to measure informativeness.  
Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) study weekly to monthly returns conditional on past intense individual investor 
trading.  Kaniel et al. (2012) and Linnainmaa (2010) study return at horizons ranging from end-of–the-day to 126 
days. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) use horizons ranging from 3 to 12 months. 
 11 
 
announcements. Consequently, we compute TBCT portfolio alphas using a variety of horizons 
from end-of-the-day to 1 year such that we can capture information of different longevity 
associated with individual investors’ trades. In order to capture returns at the end-of-the-day,10 
we deviate from Seasholes and Zhu (2010) by using the actual transaction price of a trade instead 
of the end-of-the-day price in adding a trade to the portfolio. As Seasholes and Zhu point out, 
there are thousands of trades being added to a portfolio each day and these trades would be 
diversified across the bid and ask prices. Hence, our result should not be driven by bid-ask 
bounce despite the use of transaction prices in computing returns. We present a simplified 
numerical example that illustrates the construction of the buys portfolio using transaction prices 
in Appendix B for readers interested in the details. 
V. Results	
A. Discount Retail Brokers versus Full-Service Retail Brokers 
Table 4 presents our main results that compare the informativeness of trades via discount 
and full-service retail brokers. Panel A shows the mean daily alphas of the buys-minus-sells 
TBCT portfolios and the difference-in-difference alphas. Panel B contains the corresponding t-
statistics, and Panel C shows the number of years with statistically significant positive alphas 
minus the number of years with statistically significant negative alphas. The theoretical 
                                                 
10 Returns at end-of-the-day horizon is also interesting because short-horizon individual investors such as day-
traders and those that bet on short-term price trends or reversals would experience these returns frequently. 




maximum absolute value in Table 4 Panel C is twelve because portfolio formation consumes the 
first of the thirteen years of data.11  
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
Table 4 shows that trades via discount retail brokers generate an alpha that is strikingly 
poor at the end-of-the-day horizon. The value at the close of the first day is in Panel A and shows 
that the average daily alpha is -25.93 basis points at the end-of-the-day horizon. This implies that 
if all of these trades are liquidated at the close price on the day of trade, the portfolio of buy 
trades generate a return that is 25.93 basis points lower than the return on the portfolio of sell 
trades after risk adjustment. This yields a compounded annual alpha of -47.75 percent,12 which is 
economically extremely significant.  
The large negative alpha at end-of-the-day is hypothetical in that we do not observe the 
actual horizon of any trade; it is most unlikely that all trades via discount retail brokers are 
liquidated at the end of the day. Alphas computed assuming longer holding periods show that the 
(lack of) informativeness of these trades increases (decreases) considerably over time. The 
alphas of the portfolio at 1-, 5-, and 10-day horizons remain statistically significantly negative 
but the magnitudes are much smaller. For example, if all trades via discount retail brokers were 
liquidated after 10 days, the daily alpha would be -2.48 basis points or an annualized alpha of 
only -6.40 percent. If these trades were held for one year, the buys-portfolio and the sells-
portfolio would yield the same alpha. In other words, trades via discount retail brokers earn the 
                                                 
11 Our calendar-time portfolios have a maximum horizon of one year; hence, one year of data is needed for a one 
year horizon portfolio to have the full spectrum of holding periods in its constituents and to reach a steady state with 
daily position additions and holdings liquidations. 
12 Assuming a 250 trading day year, (1-0.002593)250 - 1 = -0.4775. 
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required rate of returns if they hold their position for one year, and they earn less than the 
required return if they have shorter holding periods. 
In contrast to trades via discount retail brokers, trades via full-service retail brokers 
exhibit informativeness at 1- to 20-day horizons in the sense that their buys-minus-sells TBCT 
portfolio alphas are significantly positive. Their portfolios earn the maximum average daily 
alpha at the 5-day horizon, where the average daily alpha is 3.53 basis points or 9.22 percent 
annualized. However, these trades still do not do well over the end-of-the-day horizon; the end-
of-the-day alpha is -1.07 basis points, which annualizes to -2.71 percent, although it is only 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These results suggest that the individual investors 
who place these trades are good at anticipating returns 5 to 10 days ahead but are not good at 
intraday timing. Furthermore, these trades do not demonstrate informativeness over the longer 
horizons, exhibiting alphas that are literally zero at horizons of 3 months and beyond.  
The last row in Panel A, Full-service minus Discount, shows that trades via the full- 
service retail brokers are significantly more informative than are trades via discount retail 
brokers at horizons of up to 3 months. The difference in alphas decreases as the horizon extends, 
starting from 18.41 basis points per day (58.38 percent annualized) when marked to the end-of-
the-day through to 0.99 basis point per day (2.51 percent annualized) at the 3-month horizon. 
The difference in alphas is zero at the 6-month horizon and beyond. The t-statistics in Panel B 
reinforce the diminishing statistical significance as the calendar-time horizon extends. Panel C 
shows that trades via full-service retail brokers are more informative than are trades via discount 
retail brokers on average, in every year at horizons up to 5 days (one calendar week), in eleven of 
the twelve years at the 10-day (two calendar weeks) horizon, and in ten of the twelve years at the 
20-day (one month) horizon.  Overall, the results in Table 4 strongly support three points. First, 
trades via full-service retail brokers are systematically more informative than are trades via 
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discount retail brokers. This difference may be due to clientele differences or the informational 
or execution service of the brokers. Regardless of the explanation,13 this finding implies that 
broker type selection biases can severely influence the results of a study into the informativeness 
of individual investors’ trades. Second, informativeness (or uninformativeness) of individual 
investors’ trades is concentrated in the short term. Third, the end-of-the-day negative alphas are 
economically the largest and statistically the most significant relative to alphas at longer 
horizons. Because our methodology diversifies trades across the bid and ask prices, the end-of-
the-day result should not be due to bid-ask bounce. The last two points paint the picture that 
individual investors are trading on short-term information, but they do so with consistent errors 
at the intraday level. Their intraday trading errors may reflect their information disadvantage 
when they are trading against institutional investors who split large orders over time and exert 
price pressure at intraday to short-term horizons.  
B. Dissecting Trade Informativeness 
While we have established that the informativeness of individual investor trades depends 
on the broker type, there are many unanswered questions. Is the result driven by adverse 
selection? How would the results change with different levels of institutional investor trading?  
Are trades from different types of retail brokers trend-following or contrarian? In this section, we 
answer these questions by studying how TBCT portfolio alphas change across market and limit 
order trades, across stock size, and across factors that drive the trading direction of individual 
investors. 
                                                 
13 We do not have the data to distinguish between these explanations. 
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1. Market and Limit Order Trades: Testing Whether the Results are Due to Adverse 
Selection 
We first address whether the performance documented in the main tests reflects adverse 
selection issues associated with limit order trades (the ‘limit order effect’). Market order users 
incur the bid-ask spread in order to achieve immediate execution. Limit order users avoid paying 
the bid-ask spread by posting limit orders and offering to other traders to trade at their price. The 
costs to limit order users are that they face the non-execution risk and adverse selection (free 
trading option) risk. Non-execution risk arises when the limit order fails to execute and market 
prices drift to a less favorable level. Adverse selection risk relates to the fact that a limit order 
offers other traders an option to buy or sell shares and, conditional on execution, there is an 
increased probability that an informed trader who knows that the security is mispriced triggers 
the trade. This situation may arise simply because limit order users let their limit orders stay 
active too long by failing to update the pricing. Linnainmaa (2010) documents that the adverse 
selection costs associated with limit orders that are executed is significant for Finnish individual 
investors, and finds that this limit order effect explains a large fraction of behavioral biases. In 
order to control for the limit order effect, we partition trades during continuous trading hours into 
market order trades and limit order trades,14 and we compare their alphas in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
                                                 
14 We do not have order level data; hence, we focus on trades and do not quantify non-execution cost. There is a 
buyer and a seller in every trade. A trade that takes place at the ask price generates a market buy and a limit sell. A 
trade at the bid price generates a market sell and a limit buy. We exclude trades executed in opening and closing 
auctions in the market and limit order trades analysis.  
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Market order trades offer a clear way to assess trade informativeness because market 
order users determine the execution of their trades; thus, market orders are not subject to adverse 
selection risk. Investors with a strong view or urgent trading needs are likely to use market 
orders. Panel A of Table 5 shows that market order trades via full-service retail brokers incur the 
cost of immediacy and yield negative day's close alphas. However, these trades generate positive 
alphas from 1- to 20-day horizons. In contrast, market order trades via discount retail brokers 
generate negative alphas from end-of-the-day and up to 20-day horizons, although the magnitude 
declines over the horizon. The alpha-difference across the two broker types is significant at 
horizons up to 20 days. None of the alphas is significantly different from zero at the 3-month 
horizon and beyond. The results in Panel A suggest that the information these trades reflect is 
short-lived in nature. 
A comparison of the end-of-the-day alphas between Panel A and Panel B shows that limit 
order trades have smaller negative end-of-the-day alphas than do market order trades. This 
suggests that adverse selection is not too severe within the trading day in that there is a net 
saving in avoiding paying the bid-ask spread. The improvement in alphas is economically 
significant at about 10 basis points per day for both broker types. For limit order trades via full-
service retail brokers, the negative alphas are still negative at the 1-day horizon but the alphas 
become positive at 5- to 10-day horizons and zero thereafter. The alphas of these limit order 
trades at 1- to 20-day horizons are all lower than the corresponding alphas for market order 
trades. This finding is consistent with the presence of mild adverse selection costs with the use of 
limit orders within the 20-day horizon. Adverse selection costs are stronger in limit order trades 
via discount retail brokers, with medium to long horizon alphas remaining statistically 
significantly negative. The difference in the informativeness of limit order trades between the 
two broker types is statistically significant up to the 6-month horizon.  
 17 
 
Overall, the market and limit order trades evidence suggests that the main result in Table 
4 is robust to the limit order effect. Adverse selection costs and the limit order effect exist in the 
data but they are not the primary drivers of the level of or difference between the informativeness 
of trades via the two broker types. 
2. Stock Size: Does the Informativeness of Individual Investors’ Trades Depend on Stock 
Size?  
A stock's informational and trading environment changes with its size. Large stocks 
attract analysts and media coverage as well as trading by institutional investors. We have seen in 
Table 3 that trades via institutional brokers account for an increasing proportion of market 
turnover as stock size increases, whereas retail brokers have suffered a reduction in market share. 
This trend begs the question of whether the informativeness of individual investors’ trades 
depends on stock size. We partition the data across stock size groups and present the alphas in 
Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
The estimates in Table 6 show that informativeness of individual investors’ trades 
depends on stock size. In small stocks, where trades via pure retail brokers account for 44.6 
percent (Table 3 Panel A) of market turnover, the trades via full-service retail brokers are 
informative at all horizons, including the end-of-the-day. The daily alpha level at the 1-day 
horizon is the largest and the daily alpha difference at the end-of-the-day is the largest. In 
contrast, trades via discount retail brokers have negative alphas at all horizons, and the 
magnitude decreases steeply over the first 5 to 10 days.  
The alpha pattern in medium stocks is different. Trades via discount retail brokers have 
alphas that are negative and decrease in magnitude over longer horizons, while trades via full-
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service retail brokers generate positive alphas only over 5- to 10-day horizons. Trades via full-
service retail brokers are more informative than trades via discount retail brokers at end-of-the-
day to 3-month horizons. Much of the difference is driven by the uninformativeness of the trades 
via discount retail brokers. 
Trades via both retail broker types in large stocks have positive alphas at 5- to 20-day 
horizons, and their alphas are zeros at longer horizons. Their negative alphas at end-of-the-day 
are more than compensated by returns over the first few days. Trades via full-service retail 
brokers are the more informative trades, and they are statistically significant at horizons from 1 
to 10 days.  
The partition of the sample by stock size shows three patterns. First, trades via both types 
of retail brokers are informative in 5- to 20-day horizons in large stocks. Second, trades via full-
service brokers are informative in small stocks at all horizons. Third, the smaller the stock group, 
the larger the economic and statistical difference between the alphas of trades across the two 
retail broker types and the longer is the horizon over which we find significant alpha difference.  
The first pattern suggests that individual investors’ trades can be informative despite 
institutional investors dominating trading in these stocks. The negative alphas of trades via both 
retail broker types followed by positive returns over short but not at longer horizons suggest that 
individual investors are trading on short-term information with imperfect intraday timing. The 
second and third patterns suggest that the contribution of trades via full-service retail brokers to 
information efficiency increases as stock size decreases. 
3. Determinants of Net Trading Volume 
The TBCT portfolio methodology is elegant in aggregating a vast number of trades 
across individual investors and stocks into one return time series. However, the interpretation of 
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results would benefit from supplementary evidence about individual investors’ trading strategies. 
For instance, we speculated (above) about how individual investors may be adapting to changes 
in the informational environment. This leads to questions about whether individual investors 
condition on past returns, whether they are trend-followers or contrarians, and whether past 
information can predict their trading direction. Subsequently, we estimate a parsimonious model 
of the net volume of trades via the two types of retail brokers in order to have a deeper 
understanding of individual investors’ trading.  
Our regression specification is motivated by the findings of Kaniel, Saar and Titman 
(2008) and Barber and Odean (2008). Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) study the weekly net 
dollar volume bought by individual investors computed from individual investor trades reported 
in the New York Stock Exchange audit trail data. They find that individual investors tend to buy 
stocks following declines and sell stocks following price increases. Barber and Odean (2008) 
study data from three retail brokerage firms and find that individual investors are net buyers of 
‘attention grabbing’ stocks, e.g., stocks in the news, stocks experiencing high abnormal trading 
volume, and stocks with extreme one-day returns. Based on these findings, we estimate the 
following stock fixed effect regression specification: 
(1) Netvoli,t =  ai + b1 LagNetvoli,t + b2 LagAbvoli,t + b3 LagAbvolDumi,t + b4 Volatilityi,t  
  + b5 VolaDumi,t + b6 LagReturni,t + b7 LagBeari,t + b8 LagBulli,t  
  + b9 Newsi,t + ei,t.       . 
The stock-level fixed effects control for stock-level differences, such as stock size, and 
allow us to focus on the time series and attention grabbing variables. The unit of observation of 
the regression is a stock-day (stock i day t) and we estimate equation (1) for each broker type 
separately. We omit the subscripts in the following discussion. The dependent variable, Netvol, is 
net volume, calculated as the number of shares bought minus the number of shares sold by a 
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broker type and scaled by the number of shares outstanding. LagNetvol is the one day lagged 
value of Netvol, which we introduce to control for persistence in trading direction. The other 
variables capture past returns and the attention grabbing level of a stock-day. Table 7 Panel A 
lists their definitions. 
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
Panel B presents the regression estimates and the t-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by date to control for cross-sectional correlation. The net volume of trades via discount 
retail brokers is positively auto-correlated and positively affected by the attention grabbing 
attributes of a stock. Specifically, the net volume of these trades is positively related to lagged 
abnormal volume, lagged extreme (high and low) returns, volatility, and news on the day of 
trade. Trades made via discount retail brokers only have lower net volumes on days of extreme 
volatility. That is, these trades have a tendency to sell stocks on days in which they experience 
extreme price movements. Furthermore, these trades are trend-following in that their net volume 
is positively related to the previous day's stock return. The behavior of these trades is similar to 
the uninformed individual investors’ trades documented in Barber and Odean (2008).  
The net volume of trades via full-service retail brokers behaves differently. They are not 
significantly affected by any past return or by attention grabbing variables. The only common 
significant determinant of net volume of trades via the two broker types is the lagged net volume. 
The adjusted r-squared in the models that examine the net volume of trades via discount retail 
brokers is 9.6 percent, which is twice the size of that of full-service retail brokers.  
Overall, the net volume of trades via discount retail brokers is more predictable, more 
attracted by attention grabbing attributes of a stock, and has a higher tendency to be trend 
following relative to the net volume of trades via full-service retail brokers. These results 
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confirm our interpretation of the portfolio alpha results that trades via full-service retail brokers 
are more informative than those of discount retail brokers.  
VI. Discussion		
Our study groups trades by broker identifiers and uses hand-collected information on 
broker type. We discussed the potential effect of classification errors in Section III but readers 
may suspect that our results could be an artifact of other data issues such as individual investors 
trading through both full-service and discount broker accounts and strategic order splitting across 
broker types by institutional investors.  
If some individual investors have accounts across both types of retail brokers and place 
trades via both types of brokers, our ability to attribute the difference in trade informativeness to 
clientele difference would be limited. However, this possibility does not invalidate our findings 
per se, because we are not making claims about the source of the difference in trade 
informativeness. Furthermore, the best available evidence on the significance of multiple 
brokerage account usage, from Finland, suggests that the magnitude of the issue is small. 
Specifically, Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) use Finnish client-level data to study the value of 
using broker identifiers to predict the underlying clientele. They find that only 4.1 percent of 
Finnish households use multiple brokers. In addition, our finding of distinct determinants of net 
volume across the two broker types also affirms that our broker classification procedure 
identifies two types of pure retail broker trades and the multiple brokerage account issue is not 
evident. 
With respect to strategic order splitting by institutional investors via retail brokers, we are 
not aware of such practice being widespread during our sample period. Furthermore, the Finnish 
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evidence15 also suggests that strategic order splitting is not as strong as theories would predict. 
Specifically, Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) study the trades of households, institutional investors, 
and foreigners across broker identifiers and conclude that there are significant economic frictions 
that limit the extent to which institutional investors can split orders across brokers. Based on this 
finding, we expect only a limited level of institutional investors’ strategic order splitting via 
retail brokers. More importantly, even if institutional investors do split some orders to what we 
identify as pure retail brokers, economic reasoning would direct them to channel their trades to 
discount retail brokers. This is because discount retail brokers have the lowest trade 
informativeness and generate lower market impact; hence, trading via them would be a more 
effective camouflage for large orders. Such order splitting activity from the information-rich 
broker type to the information-poorest broker type would bias us against finding our results 
because we find trades via discount retail brokers are less informative than trades via full-service 
retail brokers. In summary, while our data is not perfect, our results remain robust against these 
data concerns and other random classification errors. 
A comparison of methodologies is also in order given the diversity in the literature. Our 
trade informativeness methodology, which is based on Seasholes and Zhu (2010), is inclusive, 
conservative, and focuses on the economic significance in quantifying the overall impact of 
individual investors’ trades on asset prices because it accounts for all trades and value-weights 
them. Other papers, such as Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2009), Kaniel et al. (2012), and Kelly and 
Tetlock (2012), focus on specific conditions or formulation of individual investor trades that 
generate higher stock returns prediction ability in the time series or in the cross-section such that 
                                                 
15  The ASX and the Finnish Helsinki Stock Exchange are both consolidated limit order book markets. Both 
countries are small open economies with their own currencies and have significant institutional investor presence. 
These similarities provide a basis to extrapolate evidence between these markets as a first order approximation. 
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a substantial fraction of individual investors’ trades are either netted out or unused for predicting 
returns. These methods also effectively equal weight observations or stocks; hence, small stocks 
have a relatively larger influence on the outcome in these methods than in our approach.  
The alphas that we compute come from the return difference between value-weighted 
portfolios of buys and sells and before brokerage commissions.16 They are positively correlated 
to, but are not directly comparable to, individual investors’ portfolio returns in studies like 
Barber and Odean (2000, 2002). Individual investors buy more than they sell on average, such 
that the returns on their buys dominate their portfolio returns. In addition, computing statistics on 
individual household portfolios introduces a lot of cross-sectional correlations because the same 
stock-day enters the averaging process many times. The Seasholes and Zhu (2010) approach 
avoids this problem.  
                                                 
16 Commissions are paid at the beginning and at the end of the trading horizon. Full-service brokers do not disclose 
their commission rate and we have no commission data at the transaction level. However, we can compute the 
breakeven one-way commission rate difference that full-service retail brokers may charge above the discount broker 
commission such that the mean alpha of trades via the two broker types would be equal. Based on the alphas 
differences reported in Table 4, Panel A, the breakeven additional one way commission for full-service retail 
brokers can be computed as ((1+daily alpha)horizon-1)/2. This means 10.05 basis points at end-of-the-day horizon, 
7.33 basis points at 1-day horizon, 21.25 basis points at 5-day horizon, 29.83 basis points at 10-day horizon, 40.66 
basis points at 20-day horizon, and 40.3 basis points at the 3-month horizon. These are upper bounds of justifiable 
commission differences, as this calculation attributes all alpha differences to broker informational, execution, and 
other services. These breakeven commissions are not unreasonably large and there is room for future research 
regarding this area. An alternative source for trade informativeness difference is clientele differences such as 




We present systematic evidence that trades via full-service retail brokers are statistically 
and economically more informative than are trades via discount retail brokers on average, across 
time, and in various sub-samples. Our findings suggest that it is important to account for broker 
type in designing studies of individual investor trading and we should exercise caution in 
generalizing the results of a specific study of unknown broker type distribution relative to the 
population.  
Our study also contributes to the literature by showing that the informativeness of 
individual investors’ trades varies across horizons and in the cross-section. Individual investors’ 
trades can be uninformative at intraday and long horizons, but informative at short horizons (5-
20 days.) We observe this pattern in trades via both types of retail brokers for large stocks, where 
institutional investors dominate market turnover. We find that only trades via full-service brokers 
are informative at longer horizons (up to 1 year) in small stocks, where institutional investors’ 
influence is lower. These results suggest that only a subset of individual investors’ trades, 
specifically those via full-service retail brokers, consistently contribute to market information 
efficiency and their contribution increases as stock size decreases. 
We believe that the relative effect of brokerage fee, brokerage service and clientele 
difference on trade informativeness is an interesting topic for future research. Another 
unexplored area is why and how individual investors use multiple brokers. These questions are 
outside the scope of our paper due to data limitations. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Market Turnover 
 
This table reports the turnover velocity, total turnover, number of trades and average trade value of all trades on the 
ASX by year from 1995 to 2007. We refer to the buy (sell) side of a trade as a buy (sell) trade. We define turnover 
as the sum of the value of buy and sell trades divided by 2. We calculate turnover velocity as the average monthly 
turnover of domestic shares, divided by their average month-end’s total market capitalization. We multiply average 
monthly figures by 12 to report the annualized value. The number of trades is the number of buy and sell trades 
divided by 2 and the average trade value is the turnover divided by the number of trades. 
 
Year Turnover Velocity (%) Turnover (AUD bil) No. Trades (mil) Avg. Trade Value (AUD) 
1995 33.9 120.5 2.9 41000 
1996 40.6 169.2 4.3 39600 
1997 43.9 212.5 5.4 39300 
1998 45.1 245.8 6.2 39700 
1999 48.3 308.0 9.7 31700 
2000 54.2 390.0 13.8 28300 
2001 68.2 487.1 12.9 37700 
2002 75.1 552.3 13.6 40500 
2003 80.4 582.2 15.8 36900 
2004 81.6 756.0 18.6 40600 
2005 88.9 973.6 26.0 37500 
2006 94.4 1228.3 38.3 32100 
2007 108.8 1804.9 69.4 26000 






Table 2. Institutional and Individual Broker Count and Market Share by Year 
 
This table presents the full sample and annual summary of the trade data between 1995 and 2007 from the ASX by broker type. We classify all brokers in the 
dataset into five categories: full-service retail, discount retail, institutional, mixed, and other. Section III describes the classification procedure. Panel A reports 
the number of brokers by broker type and Panel B reports the market share of turnover by broker type. We refer to the buy (sell) side of a trade as a buy (sell) 
trade. We define the market share of turnover of a type of broker as the sum of the value of buy and sell trades of a type of broker divided by the sum of the value 
of buy and sell trades of all brokers. 
 











Retail  Mixed Institutional Other 
1995 44 4 24 10 10 92 11.85 0.70 59.57 23.26 4.63 
1996 41 5 27 12 8 93 7.24 1.12 56.72 29.91 5.01 
1997 42 6 24 14 8 94 6.55 1.41 44.07 43.53 4.44 
1998 40 10 24 14 9 97 5.76 1.77 31.72 57.21 3.54 
1999 34 11 23 16 9 93 6.35 3.69 32.87 54.80 2.29 
2000 31 11 26 19 7 94 6.27 4.51 30.97 57.34 0.91 
2001 31 13 27 19 7 97 4.70 3.85 31.70 58.29 1.46 
2002 28 12 27 20 7 94 3.24 4.51 28.00 62.88 1.37 
2003 21 10 28 18 11 88 2.57 5.96 27.76 62.14 1.56 
2004 18 10 28 18 12 86 2.33 6.49 28.09 61.84 1.25 
2005 19 11 30 18 8 86 2.31 7.77 27.76 61.04 1.12 
2006 20 13 30 19 15 97 2.08 8.07 26.98 61.77 1.10 
2007 19 12 30 22 16 99 1.79 8.12 26.35 62.44 1.30 
All 57 21 49 36 40 203 3.22 6.22 29.65 59.33 1.59 
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Table 3. Turnover Distribution Across Stock Size and Broker Types 
 
This table presents the dollar turnover distribution of trades by stock size and broker types. We form three stock 
size groups based on the prior month-end market capitalization in every month from January 1995 to December 
2007: the largest 50 stocks, the 51st to 300th stocks, and stocks smaller than the 300th. Panel A shows the dollar 
turnover distribution of a stock size group across broker types where the percentages in Total Retail, Mixed, 
Institutional, and Unknown sum to 1.  Panel B shows the dollar turnover distribution of a broker type across 
stock size groups where the percentages in Top 50, 51st-300 th and 300 th + sum to 1. 
 
Panel A. Dollar Turnover Distribution of a Stock Size Group Across Broker Types
Size Group Full-service Retail 
Discount 
Retail Total Retail Mixed Institutional Unknown 
Top 50 2.2% 4.4% 6.7% 27.7% 63.7% 2.0% 
51 st -300 th 4.0% 7.7% 11.7% 33.6% 54.2% 0.5% 
300 th + 15.2% 29.5% 44.6% 39.5% 15.3% 0.6%
Panel B. Dollar Turnover Distribution of a Broker Type Across Stock Size Groups
Size Group Full-service Retail 
Discount 
Retail Total Retail Mixed Institutional Unknown 
Top 50 49.6% 50.0% 49.9% 65.5% 75.2% 89.5% 
51 st -300 th 32.6% 32.3% 32.4% 29.6% 23.9% 9.0% 
300 th + 17.8% 17.7% 17.7% 5.0% 1.0% 1.4% 
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Table 4. Transactions-Based Calendar-Time Buys-minus-Sells Portfolio Alphas of Brokers 
 
This table presents the transactions-based calendar-time (TBCT) buys-minus-sells portfolio alphas of the trades via full-service retail and discount retail brokers. We refer to 
the buy (sell) side of a trade as a buy (sell) trade. We add the number of shares in each buy trade of a broker type to a “buys” portfolio daily and remove the same number of 
shares from the portfolio holdings after a fixed number of days. We construct the “sells” portfolio analogously and subtract the daily sells portfolio return from the daily buys 
portfolio return to form the TBCT buys-minus-sells portfolio return. We compute the alpha as the intercept in the regression of the buys-minus-sells portfolio return on the 
Carhart (1997) factors, i.e., market, size, value factors, and stock returns over the past 12 months. The dependent variable in the "Full-service minus Discount" alpha 
calculation is the buys-minus-sells portfolio return of trades via full-service retail brokers minus the return of trades via discount retail brokers. The sample covers all trades 
on the ASX from 1995 to 2007.  Panel A reports the daily alpha in basis points at horizons ranging from End-of-the-day (i.e., each trade is held for a maximum of several 
trading hours) to 1 year. **,* denotes statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Panel B reports the Newey-West t-statistics with seven lags in 
parenthesis. Panel C summarizes the year-by-year results by reporting the number of years with positive buys-minus-sells alpha statistically significantly at least at the ten 
percent probability level minus the number of years with negative buys-minus-sells alpha statistically significantly at least at the ten percent probability level.  
Panel A. Buys-minus-sells Daily Alpha (Basis Points) 
Broker End-of-the-day 1 day 5 day 10 day 20 day 3 month 6 month 1 year 
Discount -25.93** -12.93** -3.79** -2.48** -1.77** -0.91** -0.57* -0.10
Full-service -7.52** 1.07 3.53** 2.30** 1.28** 0.08 -0.26 -0.04
Full-service minus Discount 18.41** 14.00** 7.32** 4.78** 3.05** 0.99** 0.31 0.06
 
Panel B. t-statistics 
Broker End-of-the-day 1 day 5 day 10 day 20 day 3 month 6 month 1 year 
Discount (-38.69) (-20.29) (-7.35) (-5.47) (-4.60) (-3.15) (-2.45) (-0.52)
Full-service (-10.72) (1.95) (8.70) (6.38) (4.27) (0.31) (-1.29) (-0.27)




Panel C. Number of Years with Significant Positive Returns Minus the Number of Years with Significant Negative Returns Over the 12 Years 
Broker End-of-the-day 1 day 5 day 10 day 20 day 3 month 6 month 1 year 
Discount -12 -12 -6 -2 -1 0 0 -3
Full-service -11 2 9 6 4 0 0 0




Table 5. Transactions-Based Calendar-Time Buy-minus-Sell Portfolio Alphas of Brokers by Limit and Market Orders 
This table presents the transactions-based calendar-time (TBCT) buys-minus-sells portfolio alphas of the trades via full-service retail and discount retail brokers by order 
type. We refer to the buy (sell) side of a trade as a buy (sell) trade. We add the number of shares in each buy trade of a broker type to a “buys” portfolio daily and 
remove the same number of shares from the portfolio holdings after a fixed number of days. We construct the “sells” portfolio analogously and subtract the daily sells 
portfolio return from the daily buys portfolio return to form the TBCT buys-minus-sells portfolio return. We compute the alpha as the intercept in the regression of the 
buys-minus-sells portfolio return on the Carhart (1997) factors, i.e., market, size, value factors, and stock returns over the past 12 months.  The dependent variable in the 
"Full-service minus Discount" alpha calculation is the buys-minus-sells portfolio return of trades via full-service retail brokers minus the return of trades via discount 
retail brokers. The sample covers all trades affected on the consolidated electronic limit order book on the ASX from 1995 to 2007. We refer to the side of a consolidated 
electronic limit order book trade that initiated the trade as a market order trade and the other side of the trade as a limit order trade. Panel A reports the daily alpha of 
market order trades in basis points at horizons ranging from End-of-the-day (i.e., each trade is held for a maximum of several trading hours) to 1 year. We report the 
Newey-West t-statistics with seven lags in parenthesis. **,* denotes statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Panel B reports the results of limit 
order trades. 
Panel A. Market Order Trades 
Broker Type Estimate End-of-the-day 1 day 5 day 10 day 20 day 3 month 6 month 1 year 
Discount Alpha -30.67** -13.23** -4.84** -2.73** -1.58** -0.53 -0.25 0.93* 
Full-service Alpha -12.35** 6.43** 4.20** 2.54** 1.34** 0.07 -0.24 0.13 
Full-service minus Discount Alpha 18.32** 19.66** 9.04** 5.27** 2.92** 0.60 0.01 -0.81 
Discount t-stat (-43.99) (-19.37) (-9.02) (-5.96) (-3.98) (-1.86) (-1.03) (2.24) 
Full-service t-stat (-21.21) (10.13) (8.69) (6.17) (3.85) (0.20) (-0.91) (0.47) 




Panel B. Limit Order Trades 
Broker Type Estimate End-of-the-day 1 day 5 day 10 day 20 day 3 month 6 month 1 year 
Discount Alpha -19.91** -12.51** -2.64** -2.01** -1.89** -1.44** -0.97** -0.43* 
Full-service Alpha -2.24 -5.74** 1.44** 1.14** 0.58 -0.02 -0.33 -0.17 
Full-service minus Discount Alpha 17.67** 6.77** 4.07** 3.15** 2.47** 1.42** 0.63* 0.26 
Discount t-stat (-22.87) (-13.51) (-3.94) (-3.34) (-3.94) (-4.34) (-3.69) (-2.08) 
Full-service t-stat (-1.60) (-6.43) (2.77) (2.71) (1.53) (-0.06) (-1.93) (-1.34) 







Table 6. Transactions-Based Calendar-Time Buy-minus-Sell Portfolio Alphas of Brokers by Stock Size 
 
This table presents the transactions-based calendar-time (TBCT) buys-minus-sells portfolio alphas of the trades via full-service retail and discount retail brokers by stock 
size. We group stocks by their market capitalization ranking in the prior month into Small (outside the top 300), Medium (ranked 51 to 300), and Large (the top 50).  We 
refer to the buy (sell) side of a trade as a buy (sell) trade. We add the number of shares in each buy trade of a broker type to a “buys” portfolio daily and remove the same 
number of shares from the portfolio holdings after a fixed number of days. We construct the “sells” portfolio analogously and subtract the daily sells portfolio return 
from the daily buys portfolio return to form the TBCT buys-minus-sells portfolio return. We compute the alpha as the intercept in the regression of the buys-minus-sells 
portfolio return on the Carhart (1997) factors, i.e., market, size, value factors, and stock returns over the past 12 months. The dependent variable in the "Full-service 
minus Discount" alpha calculation is the buys-minus-sells portfolio return of trades via full-service retail brokers minus the return of trades via discount retail brokers. 
The sample covers all trades on the ASX from 1995 to 2007.  Panel A reports the daily alpha in basis points at horizons ranging from End-of-the-day (i.e., each trade is 
held for a maximum of several trading hours) to 1 year. **,* denotes statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Panel B reports the Newey-West t-
statistics with seven lags in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A. Buys-minus-sells Daily Alpha (Basis Points) 
Broker Stock Size End-of-the-day 1 day 5 day 10 day 20 day 3 month 6 month 1 year 
Discount Small -48.06** -30.10** -13.02** -8.26** -5.35** -2.48** -1.63** -0.65
Medium -30.33** -15.38** -4.52** -3.21** -2.66** -1.39** -0.92** -0.64*
Large -12.23** -2.43** 2.04** 1.31* 0.98* 0.26 0.31 0.21
Full-service Small 9.62** 11.04** 6.18** 4.06** 2.21** 0.99** 0.45** 0.31*
Medium -13.63** -2.50** 2.01** 1.27** 0.48 -0.34 -0.33 -0.32
Large -10.05** 1.00 3.60** 2.40** 1.23** 0.50 0.32 0.22
Full-service minus Discount Small 57.67** 41.14** 19.19** 12.32** 7.56** 3.46** 2.08** 0.96**
Medium 16.70** 12.88** 6.53** 4.49** 3.14** 1.05** 0.59 0.32





Panel B. t-statistics 
Broker Stock Size End-of-the-day 1 day 5 day 10 day 20 day 3 month 6 month 1 year 
Discount Small (-33.50) (-26.15) (-14.93) (-10.51) (-8.38) (-5.39) (-4.14) (-1.90)
Medium (-38.62) (-19.48) (-7.08) (-5.64) (-5.16) (-3.60) (-2.78) (-2.20)
Large (-21.60) (-3.55) (3.43) (2.41) (2.06) (0.68) (0.95) (0.74)
Full-service Small (11.02) (14.31) (12.05) (9.93) (7.24) (4.87) (2.70) (2.40)
Medium (-24.42) (-3.99) (4.13) (3.00) (1.27) (-1.18) (-1.41) (-1.76)
Large (-4.99) (0.89) (5.71) (4.61) (2.75) (1.43) (1.11) (1.11)
Full-service minus Discount Small (32.85) (29.49) (19.73) (14.39) (10.96) (7.22) (5.10) (2.65)
Medium (20.12) (15.57) (10.29) (8.13) (6.56) (2.95) (1.83) (1.07)





Table 7. Determinants of Net Volume Traded by Broker Types 
 
We group trades from 1995 to 2007 by broker type to calculate the net trading volume and estimate the following panel regression specification with stock-level fixed 
effects, 
Netvoli,t =  ai + b1 LagNetvoli,t + b2 LagAbvoli,t + b3 LagAbvolDumi,t + b4 Volatilityi,t + b5 VolaDumi,t + b6 LagReturni,t + b7 LagBeari,t + b8 LagBull + b9 News + ei,t   
The unit of observation is per stock i day t. Panel A lists the variable definitions. Panel B lists the regression estimates and t-stats using standard errors clustered by date. 
** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. We suppress the large number of stock specific intercept, ai, and their corresponding t-
statistic for presentation purposes. 
Panel A. Regression Variable List 
Variable Name Definition 
Netvol Net volume The number of shares bought minus the number of shares sold by a broker type and scaled by the number of shares outstanding. 
LagNetvol Lagged net volume One day lagged value of Netvol. 
LagAbvol Lagged abnormal 
volume 
The lagged daily volume (unsigned total number of shares) over the previous one year's average daily volume. 
LagAbvolDum Lagged extreme 
volume 
Equals one if the lagged daily volume is twice the standard deviation above the previous one year's average daily volume, 0 
otherwise. 
Volatility Volatility The absolute daily return on the current day. 
VolaDum Extreme volatility Equals one if the daily volatility on the current day is two standard deviations higher than the average daily volatility in the 
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previous year, 0 otherwise. 
LagReturn Lagged return Lagged daily stock return. 
LagBear Lagged return is 
extremely negative  
Equals one if the past day's stock return is two standard deviations or more lower than the previous one year's average daily 
return, 0 otherwise. 
LagBull Lagged return is 
extremely positive  
Equals one if the past day's stock return is two standard deviations or more higher than the previous one year's average daily 
return, 0 otherwise. 
News News day Equals one if the stock has at least one market sensitive news announcement on the ASX during the trading day or after trading 
hours on the previous trading day, 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel B. Regression Estimates 
Variables Discount Full-service 
Coef (x103) t-stat Coef (x103) t-stat 
LagNetvol 276.44** (10.04) 205.14** (6.27) 
LagAbvol 0.05** (3.03) 0.00 (-0.10) 
LagAbvolDum -0.18 (-1.83) -0.01 (-0.15) 
Volatility 0.34** (2.29) 0.02 (0.19) 
VolaDum -0.05** (-3.06) 0.01 (1.32) 
LagReturn 0.35** (3.21) -0.12 (-1.37) 
LagBear 0.05** (3.06) 0.00 (0.26) 
LagBull 0.03** (2.61) -0.01 (-0.48) 
News 0.15** (11.79) -0.01 (-0.93) 
Observations 718,579  718,579  
Stocks 2,451  2,451  
Adj R2 9.6% 4.5% 
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Appendix A: Broker Classification Guide 
This table lists the criteria used to classify brokers based on different data sources. 
Broker Classification Data Source 
Broker Website or Archived Broker Website Company Announcements, Newspapers, Books, papers, 
web articles 
Discount Retail Broker Site states brokerage costs (e.g. ‘trade from $19.95’) 
prominently and does not offer full-service or 
institutional sales. 
States the broker is a discount broker, with no mention of 
the broker being institutional.  
Full-Service Retail Broker Site states the broker provides full-service or private 
client brokerage services and does not provide 
institutional sales. 
States the broker is a full-service or private client broker. 
Institutional Provides only institutional or wholesale client (wealthy 
or high net worth individuals) brokerage services and 
does not provide full-service retail brokerage, or has a 
separate private client brokerage arm. Also includes 
proprietary trading desks and market makers. 
States the broker is an institutional or wholesale broker. 
Mixed States that broker provides both full-service brokerage 
and institutional sales. 
States that the broker has retail and institutional brokerage 
services. 





Appendix B. Illustration of Transactions-Based Calendar-Time portfolio return calculation. 
This table illustrates the mechanics of the transactions-based calendar-time portfolio methodology with an example of a 10-day buy portfolio with three buy trades. The 
sell portfolio can be defined analogously. There are two trades in stock A and one trade in stock B. The transaction date, size, and trade price are listed in the first five 
columns. Close Price represents the end of day price of the stocks. Daily Return is computed based on Close Price, dividend and capitalization adjustments. Holdings at 
Prior Close are the share holdings of the TBCT portfolio at the end of the previous day and they account for any new position generated in the previous day. The number 
of shares in new trades are included in the portfolio holdings for 10 full days. The TBCT Portfolio Base Value sum the Value of Holdings at Prior Close and the Value of 
New Trades. TBCT portfolio return is the value-weighted average of the Daily Return on Holdings at Prior Close and the return on the Value of New Trades computed 
as Close Price/Trade Price -1. For example, TBCT portfolio return on 960109 is (-0.61*58,800+80,000*(33.9/32.9-1))/(58,800+80,000)=0.0316. The portfolio formation 


















  A B A B A B A B A B A B A B   
960102 6,000   10.00   10.18 32.93             60,000   60,000 1.80% 
960103         10.33 33.06 1.47% 0.40% 6,000   61,080       61,080 1.47% 
960104         9.92 32.93 -3.97% -0.39% 6,000   61,980       61,980 -3.97% 
960105         9.99 32.87 0.71% -0.18% 6,000   59,520       59,520 0.71% 
960106         9.96 32.87 -0.30% 0.00% 6,000   59,940       59,940 -0.30% 
960107         9.81 33.36 -1.51% 1.49% 6,000   59,760       59,760 -1.51% 
960108         9.80 32.79 -0.10% -1.71% 6,000   58,860       58,860 -0.10% 
960109   2,500   32.00 9.74 33.90 -0.61% 3.39% 6,000   58,800     80,000 138,800 3.16% 
960110         9.83 34.00 0.92% 0.30% 6,000 2,500 58,440 84,750     143,190 0.55% 
960111         9.88 34.68 0.51% 2.00% 6,000 2,500 58,980 85,000     143,980 1.39% 
960112         9.72 34.92 -1.62% 0.69% 6,000 2,500 59,280 86,700     145,980 -0.25% 
960113 3,000   10.00   9.70 34.55 -0.21% -1.06%   2,500   87,300 30,000   117,300 -1.56% 
960114         9.48 35.09 -2.27% 1.56% 3,000 2,500 29,100 86,375     115,475 0.60% 
960115         9.55 35.38 0.74% 0.83% 3,000 2,500 28,440 87,725     116,165 0.80% 
960116         9.49 34.94 -0.63% -1.24% 3,000 2,500 28,650 88,450     117,100 -1.09% 
960117         9.34 34.81 -1.58% -0.37% 3,000 2,500 28,470 87,350     115,820 -0.67% 
960118         9.38 34.20 0.43% -1.75% 3,000 2,500 28,020 87,025     115,045 -1.22% 
960119         9.38 34.89 0.00% 2.02% 3,000 2,500 28,140 85,500     113,640 1.52% 
960120         9.04 35.03 -3.63% 0.40% 3,000   28,140       28,140 -3.63% 
960121         9.03 35.05 -0.11% 0.06% 3,000   27,120       27,120 -0.11% 
960122         9.00 35.88 -0.33% 2.37% 3,000   27,090       27,090 -0.33% 
960123         8.92 36.40 -0.89% 1.45% 3,000   27,000       27,000 -0.89% 
 
